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Reasoning Per Se and Horizontal Price
Fixing: An Emerging Trend
in Antitrust Litigation?
Joseph W. deFuria, Jr.*
The applicability of the per se rule, to horizontal price fixing prac-
tices2'in antitrust litigation has been one of the staples of judicial in-
terpretation of the Sherman Act 3 for over fifty years.4 Although the
United States Supreme Court has always posited the per se rule in a
straightforward fashion, its application to alleged unlawful activity,
and to price fixing conduct in particular, has at times been less than
crystal clear.5 Nevertheless, until the Court decided Broadcast Mu-
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1. The per se doctrine was fashioned by the United States Supreme Court in or-
der to streamline judicial analysis of alleged anticompetitive market practices under
the antitrust laws, and deems certain types of business arrangements inherently an-
ticompetitive without any need to determine if the alleged restrictive practice has actu-
ally injured market competition. See generally L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF ANTITRUST § 67, at 182-86 (1977) [hereinafter cited as L. SULLIVAN]. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1028 (5th ed. 1979).
2. A horizontal price fixing practice generally involves an agreement among com-
petitors at the same level of the market structure, such as producers, wholesalers, or
retailers, to set, directly or indirectly, a price for a particular commodity.
3. 15 U.S.C. 1-2 (1976). Section 1 states in relevant part: "Every contract, combi-
nation in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal ...."
Section 2 states in relevant part: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of trade or commerce among the several States... shall be deemed guilty of a
felony misdemeanor."
4. See infra note 5.
5. See generally National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S.
679 (1978) (the Court used the rule of reason to determine whether section 1 of the
sic, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,6 horizontal price fix-
ing situations to which the Court would apply the per se rule
appeared fairly predictable. 7 With its decision in Broadcast Music,
however, the Court appeared to take a different approach. The Court
at least tacitly acknowledged a reasoning process it had at times em-
ployed in the past in order to determine whether to apply the per se
rule to an alleged horizontal price fixing practice.
A study of subsequent Supreme Court cases reveals that the high-
est Court seems to be reshaping its approach to per se illegality in
horizontal price fixing situations. The new approach focuses more
particularly on the actual economic impact of alleged Sherman Act
violations on competitive market conditions, and not merely on for-
malistic labels. These formalistic labels previously tended to charac-
terize per se violations in order to distinguish those business practices
to which the per se rule will in fact apply.8 The Court's apparent de-
parture from traditional per se analysis is still somewhat murky.
Sherman Act was violated); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36
(1977) (the Court overruled the per se rule, as stated in United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967)); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253
(1963) (the Court held that the granting by the district court of summary judgment for
the government was improper since the legality of the agreement should be deter-
mined by trial); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (the practice of
selling one product only on condition that the vendor will buy another product was
found to be a per se violation where the seller has substantial economic power to re-
strain free trade); Kiejer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211
(1951) (an agreement to seal the maximum resale prices in an interstate trade found to
be in violation of the Sherman Act); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150 (1940) (price-fixing agreements that fall short of exercising "dominion and control"
over the market may, nonetheless, be a per se violation); Suger Inst. v. United States,
297 U.S. 553 (1936) (because of the particular character of the industry, the Court ac-
knowledged the practice of announcing prices, but when the actions were taken to se-
cure observance of the price, a violation of the Act occurred); Appalachian Coals, Inc.
v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933) (the standard of reasonableness was used to deter-
mine that formation of a corporation by competitors to act as their agents was not a
violation of the Sherman Act); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392
(1927) (regardless of reasonableness of the price, an agreement to maintain a uniform
price by competitors who held 80% of the market was in violation of the Sherman
Act); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898) (competitors
who agreed not to compete within the U.S. were perpetually enjoined by the court of
appeals, but the Supreme Court held that such an injunction was too broad since the
enforcement of the Sherman Act would be limited to interstate commerce); United
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) (the Court held that the
government could maintain the suit by simply showing that restraint in trade is a nec-
essary effect without proving intent).
6. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
7. There have been occasions, of course, when dissenting opinions have opposed
characterization of an alleged price fixing restraint as per se unlawful. See, e.g., United
States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
8. Although the trend, discussed infra, may well encompass the per se category
of restraints in general, only horizontal price fixing practices will be brought to issue
here. See also Brunet, Streamlining Antitrust Litigation by "Facial Examination" of
Restraints: The Burger Court and the Per Se-Rule of Reason Distinction, 60 WASH. L.
REV. 1 (1984-85).
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Yet, some factors can be clarified and conclusions reached as to the
Court process for determining the applicability of the per se rule to
horizontal price fixing cases in antitrust litigation.9
In Standard Oil Co. v. United States,o the Supreme Court declared
that, in general, the Sherman Act must be construed in the light of
reason. In order to determine whether a restraint of trade is unlaw-
ful, the Court must ascertain the following: 1) the facts peculiar to
the particular business involved; 2) the nature of the restraint and its
practical effects on the market; and 3) the reasons for the Act's adop-
tion."1 The Court adopted this "rule of reason" analysis in part be-
cause of the possibility that a narrow reading of section 1 of the
Sherman Act would make illegal all business agreements which
might in some insignificant degree restrain trade or competition.12
As Justice Brandeis pointed out almost sixty years earlier in Board of
Trade of City of Chicago v. United States:
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To
bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality is whether
the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby pro-
motes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy com-
petition .... The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason
9. The process has not necessarily been one of clarification. Rather, as subse-
quent lower court decisions indicate, the Court's recent approach has created consider-
able confusion as to how and when to apply the per se rule to alleged horizontal price
fixing practices. See, e.g., Northwest Publications, Inc. v. Crumb, 752 F.2d 473 (9th Cir.
1985) (although the price maintenance clause in a contract between the publisher and
distributors was a per se violation of the Sherman Act, the latter's failure to establish
causation barred recovery); Vogel v. American Soc'y of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598 (7th
Cir. 1984) (prohibition of fixed percentage appraiser fees by the association of apprais-
ers did not constitute price-fixing); Compact v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville & Da-
vidson County, Tenn., 594 F. Supp. 1567 (M.D. Tenn. 1984) (black architectural firms
violated the Sherman Act by presenting common contractual terms to attract minority
businesses); United States v. Stop & Shop Cos., No. B 84-51, slip op. (D. Conn. Nov. 8,
1984) (available in 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,689) (a conspiracy to end discounts on
"loss leader" would be a per se violation of price fixing although it enhances competi-
tion in certain areas); Ratino v. Medical Serv. of the Dist. of Columbia (Blue Shield),
718 F.2d 1260 (4th Cir. 1983) (whether an insurance policy, which requires "peer re-
view," violates the Sherman Act was a question of fact); Shafer v. Bulk Petroleum
Corp., 569 F. Supp. 621 (1983) (the per se standard was applicable to claims against sell-
ing maximum resale price and tying prices of various items to a lease contract); Medi-
cal Arts Pharmacy of Stamford, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Conn., Inc., 675
F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1982) (the court employed the rule of reason to determine whether
the particular agreements violated the Sherman Act since the agreements were novel
restraints); National Elec. Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. National Constructors Ass'n, 678
F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1982) (the agreement between the incorporated trade association and
the unincorporated labor association was a per se violation).
10. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
11. Id. at 62-63.
12. See Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. at 606.
for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained,
are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save an other-
wise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent
may help the court to interpret facts and predict consequences.
1 3
By examining the characteristics of the alleged restraint, the Court is
able to determine its reasonableness, and specifically whether it pro-
motes or suppresses competition. 14 Thus, under the rule of reason,
all the facts of a case are carefully weighed to determine whether the
restrictive practice should be prohibited.15
Because this analytical process was often complicated and difficult
to assess,16 the Court later formulated an overall judicial doctrine of
per se illegality. This doctrine held that certain business relation-
ships were, in themselves, violations of the Act, without regard to a
consideration of their reasonableness. As the Court noted in North-
ern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States:
[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively pre-
sumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to
the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use. This
principle of per se unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints
which are proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of
everyone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for an incredibly compli-
cated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the in-
dustry involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at
large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable-an inquiry so
often wholly fruitless when undertaken. 1 7
These relationships or practices, of which horizontal price fixing
was one,18 were therefore manifestly anticompetitive and thus con-
clusively presumed illegal, regardless of the particular problems or
characteristics of the industry in which they operated. Also, no
showing of their purpose, aim, or effect on the market could be
raised in their defense.19 Thus, an agreement by members of a busi-
13. 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1913). Thus, read literally, the statute "would outlaw the en-
tire body of private contract law. Yet, it is that body of law which establishes the en-
forceability of commercial agreements and enables competitive markets-indeed, a
competitive economy-to function effectively." National Soc'y of Professional Engi-
neers, 435 U.S. at 688.
14. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
15. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
16. It is, for example, inordinately difficult to ascertain whether prices are reason-
able or not. See Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 213-14. The Court, quoting from
its opinion in United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927),
pointed out the difficulty in determining reasonableness of prices by indicating that "a
complete survey of our economic organization and choice between rival philosophies
[must be examined]." Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 213-14.
17. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5. See also Continental T. V., Inc., 433 U.S. at
50 n.16. The Court enumerated certain advantages of the per se rule. However, it also
noted that per se rules would introduce unintended and undesirable rigidity in the law.
Id.
18. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
19. The per se category of antitrust violations also includes situations where the
sale of one product is tied to the sale of a different one. See, e.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Min-
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ness combination (that substantially controlled a trade or business in
interstate or foreign commerce) which concerned prices to be
charged for their commodity was per se an undue and unreasonable
restraint of trade and commerce.20  As the Court pointed out in
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.:
The aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective, is the elimina-
tion of one form of competition. The power to fix prices, whether reasonably
exercised or not, involves the power to control the market and to fix arbitrary
and unreasonable prices. The reasonable price fixed today may through eco-
nomic and business changes become the unreasonable price of tomorrow.
Once established, it may be maintained unchanged because of the absence of
competition secured by the agreement for a price reasonable when fixed.
Agreements which create such potential power may well be held to be in
themselves unreasonable or unlawful restraints, without the necessity of min-
ute inquiry whether a particular price is reasonable or unreasonable as fixed
and without placing on the government in enforcing the Sherman Law the
burden of ascertaining from day to day whether it has become unreasonable
through the mere variation of economic conditions. 2 1
Until the Supreme Court decided the case of Broadcast Music,22
horizontal price fixing practices were sentenced to per se condemna-
tion in a fairly traditional and predictable manner, in accordance
with the Court's earlier pronouncements about the purpose and use
of per se rules.23 But, in Broadcast Music, the Court ruled that the
method of licensing, by which two New York licensing agencies au-
thorized the use of copyrighted musical compositions for broadcast
purposes in exchange for a fixed annual fee, a form of horizontal
price fixing, was not illegal per se under the Sherman Act. Instead,
such method of licensing must be proved unlawful under the rule of
reason standard normally employed in antitrust cases. 24 In so hold-
ing, the Court reshaped its earlier and simpler approach to per se il-
legality under the antitrust laws in favor of a more deliberate and
neapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944), (where competitors agree to di-
vide markets horizontally); see also Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S.
207 (1959) (Klor's, a retail store owner, filed suit because a chain of department stores
and national manufacturers boycotted the sale of goods. The Court found such an act
to be in violation of the Sherman Act).
20. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 218; United States v. Trenton Potteries
Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927). Indeed, even if the combination was not in a position to
control the market, to the extent that it fixed prices, it had the inherent power to in-
terfere directly with the free play of the marketplace. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. at 221.
21. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. at 397-98.
22. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,
421 U.S. 773 (1975).
24. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 24.
sensitive adjudicative process. This new process was specifically cal-
culated to bring operation of the per se rule into line with the legisla-
tive purpose of the Sherman Act, which is to prohibit only those
business combinations or relationships which have a significantly det-
rimental effect on competition or trade.25
In Broadcast Music, the Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (here-
inafter CBS) brought an antitrust action in United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York against the American
Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (hereinafter ASCAP),
Broadcast Music, Inc. (hereinafter BMI), and their members and af-
filiates.26 The plaintiff alleged that the licensing system which AS-
CAP and BMI utilized to license the performance of copyrighted
musical compositions in their repertories for broadcast purposes 27 vi-
olated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, and constituted copyright
misuse. Members of ASCAP and BMI, a group of sellers or licensers,
offered their products through a single agency at a single price, in the
form of a blanket license. Thus, CBS contended that competition as
to price among the individual copyright owners was restricted. Both
agencies were therefore unlawful monopolies operating in restraint
of trade, and the blanket license in particular amounted, inter alia,
to illegal price fixing.28 Since neither ASCAP nor BMI allowed the
CBS network to pay only for those compositions which it actually
used,29 CBS sought injunctive relief under section 16 of the Clayton
Act.30
25. Id. at 7-16.
26. Both ASCAP and BMI are unincorporated membership associations comprised
of authors, composers, and publishers who own copyrights on separate musical compo-
sitions, and function as "clearinghouse" agencies for the licensing of their members'
copyrighted materials for nondramatic performance purposes. Broadcast Music, 441
U.S. at 5. Since most composers and publishers find it expedient to engage the services
of ASCAP or BMI in order to negotiate with and license users, and to detect unauthor-
ized uses of their works, the repertories (inventories) of both agencies are enormous.
Id. at 5, 20-21.
27. Both agencies offered only two kinds of licenses to users. A "blanket" license
permitted the use of any and all compositions in the particular agency's inventory "as
often as the licensees desired for a stated term in exchange for a negotiated fixed an-
nual fee, based on a percentage of the network's total advertising revenues." Id. at 5.
A "per program" license also allowed unlimited usage, but its fee was determined by a
percentage of the revenues from the number of network programs using the agency's
composition. Thus, the fee for each type of license depended neither on the amount
nor type of music actually used. See. e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. American
Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 562 F.2d 130, 133-34 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
granted, 439 U.S. 817 (1978) (the similarities and differences between "blanket" and
"per program" licenses explained).
28. Broadcast Music, 494 U.S. at 6.
29. CBS held blanket licenses on an annual basis from both organizations. Id. at 5.
See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 562 F.2d at 130. This was an antitrust action against
licensing agencies for issuing blanket licenses. The Court held such a practice to vio-
late the Sherman Act.
30. 15 U.S.C. 16 (1982).
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Specifically, the requested injunction directed both agencies to of-
fer CBS performing rights or terms which reflected the actual use of
music by CBS. An alternative request was to enjoin ASCAP and
BMI from offering blanket licenses to any television network.31 Fol-
lowing a trial limited to the issue of liability, the district court denied
relief and dismissed the complaint.32 On appeal by CBS, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.33 The
Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari34 to consider two is-
sues: first, whether the per se rule applied to the blanket license sys-
tem, and second, whether this practice constituted copyright misuse.
In ruling against application of the per se rule to the blanket li-
censing practices of ASCAP and BMI, the Supreme Court noted that
"[i]t is only after considerable experience with certain business rela-
tionships that courts classify them as per se violations [of the Sher-
man Act]." 35  By contrast, the sui generis nature of the music
industry and the practical complexities of licensing musical perform-
ance rights counseled against easy conclusions or glib generaliza-
31. CBS also sought a declaration of copyright misuse under the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201-02 (1982). Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 562 F.2d at 132.
32. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Pub-
lishers, 400 F. Supp 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); see also Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v.
American Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 337 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
The district court refused to declare the blanket license practice price fixing illegal per
se, partly because the individual members of both ASCAP and BMI were able to be-
stow only non-exclusive licensing rights on the agencies. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at
5. See the consent decree in United States v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors,
& Publishers, 1950-51 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (amending United
States v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 1940-43; Trade Cas.
(CCH) 56,104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941)). See also the consent decree in United States v.
Broadcast Music, Inc., 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,941 (1966)). Thus, the CBS network
was always free to negotiate with the individual copyright owners for a better price.
33. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 562 F.2d at 130. In reversing the district court,
the court of appeals reasoned that, even if the individual copyright owner members of
ASCAP or BMI were willing to license the performing rights to their compositions
separately, "the determination of how much each [member received from the agency's]
common pot [was still] an artificial fixing of the price to that member of the combina-
tion for his composition," since ASCAP and BMI periodically distributed royalties to
their copyright owner members with little regard to the blanket license fee. Id. at 136.
(Both agencies distributed royalties to their members in direct proportion to the "na-
ture and amount of use of their music." Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 5.) Furthermore,
since the availability of the blanket license inevitably affected price negotiations for
direct licensing with the individual copyright members, the system ultimately tam-
pered with price structures, and was therefore illegal. Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
562 F.2d at 136. Thus, the court of appeals remanded and directed that ASCAP issue a
per use license. Id. at 140, quoted in Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 7 n.10.
34. 439 U.S. 817 (1978).
35. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 9; (quoting Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. at 607-08).
tions.36 The cost of sales negotiations and policing copyright license
violations would be prohibitive for most individual authors and com-
posers. Thus, the blanket license appeared to be a market arrange-
ment reasonably necessary to effectuate the legal and economic
rights available to individual copyright owners.3 7 The blanket license
would also control the public performance of their musical composi-
tions. 38 Viewed in this light, the blanket license was more than just a
licensing vehicle for many separate musical compositions. Instead, it
became a vital sales and enforcement mechanism, which most copy-
right owners found essential.39 More important, the consequences of
the blanket license itself had a synergistic effect on its component
parts, which further distinguished it from the typical price fixing
model.40
Notwithstanding their reasonableness, usefulness, or necessity,
"agreements among competitors to fix prices on their individual
goods ... [were] among those concerted activities ... the Court had
held to be within the per se category." 4 1 But, in Broadcast Music, the
Court had enough doubts "about the extent to which... [the blanket
license] practice threatened 'the central nervous system of the econ-
omy' "42 to reject application of the per se rule.43 There was, for ex-
ample, no agreement by individual composers and authors not to sell
36. The court stated in part:
The Sherman Act has always been discriminatingly applied in the light of eco-
nomic realities. There are situations in which competitors have been permit-
ted to form joint selling agencies or other pooled activities, subject to strict
limitations under the antitrust laws to guarantee against abuse of the collec-
tive power thus created .... This case appears ... to involve such a situation.
The extraordinary number of users spread across the land, the ease with
which a performance may be broadcast, the sheer volume of copyrighted com-
positions, the enormous quantity of separate performances each year, the im-
practicability of negotiating individual licenses for each composition, and the
ephemeral nature of each performance all combine to create unique market
conditions for performance rights to recorded music.
Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 14-15 (quoting Memorandum for United States as Amicus
Curiae at 10-11, K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing Corp., 372 F.2d 1 (Cir. 1967), petition
for cert. filed, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968) (No. 147).
37. See the Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17
U.S.C. 111, 506 (1976)).
38. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 19 n.32.
39. The blanket license thus served an eminently practical use-"unplanned,
rapid, indemnified access to . . . a repertory of compositions", as well as a reliable
method for owners to collect fees for the use of their copyrighted material. Id. at 20.
40. Id. at 22-23.
41. Id. at 8.
42. Id. at 23 (quoting United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226
n. 59 (1940)).
43. One of the inevitable consequences of an aggregate license was that its price
had to be established. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 21. It was not the individual mem-
bers of ASCAP or BMI who set the blanket license fee, but the agency itself. Id. at 23.
Even the particular agency, however, was not the ultimate price setting authority, for
if a prospective licensee and the agency were unable to agree on a price, the District
Court for the Southern District of New York would set a reasonable one. Id. at 11.
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individually in any other market.44
The Court also found two particularly persuasive facts. First, there
had been intense scrutiny of the licensing practices of ASCAP and
BMI in the past.45 Second, Congress itself had specifically provided
for blanket licensing and similar practices in the Copyright Act of
1976.46
In light of these factors, the Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals.4 7 The case was then remanded to the court of appeals for a
determination of the legality of the blanket licensing system under
the rule of reason, if the issue had been preserved by CBS in that
court.
48
The significance of the Broadcast Music decision was the Court's
departure from its traditional approach towards application of the
per se rule to alleged horizontal price fixing practices in antitrust liti-
gation. In previous decisions, the Court focused on the fact that the
justification or reasonableness of a price set by agreement by a busi-
ness combination was irrelevant to a determination of its lawfulness
under the Sherman Act. The Court had also previously noted that a
price had been fixed by agreement, rather than on the effect which
the agreement may have had on the market.49 Although such atten-
tion was perhaps natural enough in "price fixing" cases, it neverthe-
See also the amended consent decree in United States v. American Soc'y of Composers,
Authors & Publishers, 1950-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
44. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 24 n.42. Under the amended consent decree, indi-
vidual members retained the right to license individually the public performance of
their works. Thus, there were no "real impediments preventing direct dealing by the
television network with individual composers if it so chose." Id. at 12.
45. "Courts have twice construed the [ASCAP consent decrees] not to require AS-
CAP to issue ["per use"] licenses for selected portions of its repertory." Broadcast Mu-
sic, 441 U.S. at 12. Of course, the consent decrees did not immunize ASCAP from
liability as to the rights of nonparties. Id. at 13.
46. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 15-16; see the provisions of 17 U.S.C.
111(d)(5)(A), 111(c)(4) (1976) relating to secondary transmissions by cable television
systems and to the use of copyrighted compositions in jukeboxes.
47. The court of appeals found price fixing illegal per se under the Sherman Act.
48. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 25 n.44. On remand, the court of appeals held the
blanket license lawful under the rule of reason. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v.
American Soc'y of Composers, Authors, & Publishers, 620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1980).
49. See generally Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 346 U.S. 1 (1958); United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United
States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 291 (1927);
Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918) (the Court held
that the test of legality depends upon whether the agreement promotes or destroys
competition); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898),
affd and modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1898); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n,
166 U.S. 290 (1897).
less tended to obscure the ultimate rationale behind the per se rule,
which was to facilitate application of the Sherman Act to particular
sets of facts.SO
In Standard Oil 51 and American Tobacco Co. v. United States,52
the Court construed the Sherman Act to prohibit only those re-
straints upon interstate or foreign commerce which were unreasona-
ble.53 Whether the type of restraint was reasonable must, in turn, be
decided by its effect on competition.5 4 In order to expedite the deter-
mination of the reasonableness of certain business practices, the
Court later developed per se categories. These categories were appli-
cable to specific types of practices which had already been adjudged
inherently anticompetitive. Thus, the need for elaborate and time-
consuming analysis was eliminated.55 Originally, then, it was the det-
rimental effect which these restraints had on market competition
which was controlling, and not simply the labels which many of these
practices had acquired. 56
In Broadcast Music, in order to ascertain whether a per se applica-
tion was appropriate, the Court concentrated on the effect of the
blanket license on the operation of the music industry. In other
words, the applicability of per se illegality did not turn solely on
whether a price had been fixed. Rather, the issue was "whether the
practice [also] facially appear[ed] to be one that would always or al-
most always tend to restrict competition and decrease output ... or
instead one designed to 'increase economic efficiency and render mar-
kets more, rather than less competitive.' "57 Thus, the court of ap-
peals' conclusion that an organization of composers, authors, and
publishers which set its price for the blanket license it sold did not
alone establish that the particular practice was so "plainly anticompe-
titive"58 as to fall within the per se category. It was not simply a
question of whether two or more potential competitors literally
"fixed" a price. 59 The blanket license seemed to serve a vital need in
50. Perhaps, too, "it [was] necesary to characterize the challenged conduct as fall-
ing within or without that category of behavior to which ...the label 'per se price
fixing' [had been applied]." Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 9.
51. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
52. 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
53. See also Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. at 396.
54. Id. at 397.
55. See Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. at 607.
56. See Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 215-16; see also Appalachian Coals,
Inc., 288 U.S. at 375.
57. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 19-20; see also Continental T V., Inc., 433 U.S. at
49-50.
58. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 9.
59. "Literalness is overly simplistic and often overbroad." Id. Moreover, 'price
fixing' is a shorthand way of describing certain categories of business behavior to
which the per se rule has been held applicable. The Court of Appeals' literal approach
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the music business. It did not "always or almost always tend to re-
strict competition." 60 Thus, the Court held the licensing practices of
ASCAP and BMI distinguishable from other practices to which the
per se rule was found clearly appropriate.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's consideration of factors for ap-
plying the per se rule to an alleged horizontal price fixing practice in
Broadcast Music contradicted earlier Court pronouncements regard-
ing the general application of the per se rule to price fixing cases.
For example, in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,61 the Court
stated:
Congress has not left with us the determination of whether or not particular
price-fixing schemes are wise or unwise, healthy or destructive .... Whatever
may be its peculiar problems and characteristics, the Sherman Act, so far as
price-fixing agreements are concerned, establishes one uniform rule applica-
ble to all industries alike.
6 2
Still later, in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United
States,63 the Court reasoned: -
There are, thus, two complementary categories of antitrust analysis. In the
first category are agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly
anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish
their illegality-they are 'illegal per se.' In the second category are agreements
whose competitive effect can only be evaluated by analyzing the facts peculiar
to the business, the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was im-
posed. In either event, the purpose of the analysis is to form a judgment about
the competitive significance of the restraint; it is not to decide whether a pol-
icy favoring competition is in the public interest, or in the interest of the
members of an industry.6 4
Thus, per se rules were designed to promote efficient characteriza-
tions of economic practices.
But, in Broadcast Music, the Court engaged in an extensive analy-
sis of the music industry in order to reject application of the rule.
For instance, the Court concentrated on the economic effect of the
blanket license (the alleged price fixing mechanism) upon both the
individual copyright owners and the music industry. Such an inquiry
would normally be reserved for a rule of reason analysis. The
Court's approach, employed to decide whether to apply the per se
rule, appears to be one of the central characteristics of the Broadcast
does not alone establish that [the] particular practice is one of those types or that it is
'plainly anticompetitive'...." Id.
60. Id. at 19-20.
61. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
62. Id. at 221-22.
63. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
64. Id. at 692 (emphasis added).
Music decision.65
This newly articulated approach to per se illegality in a horizontal
price fixing case was the logical, if unanticipated, outcome of at least
two of the Court's previous rulings.66 The prior rulings restricted the
simplistic application of per se rules in antitrust litigation. For in-
stance, in White Motor Co. v. United States,67 the United States
brought suit against a manufacturer of trucks. The government con-
tended that the manufacturer's franchise contracts which restricted,
in part, the geographic areas within which distributors and dealers
were permitted to sell trucks and parts, constituted per se violations
of sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act. The Court refused to bring
this vertical arrangement 68 within the per se rationale. Instead, the
Court declared that it "[knew] too little of the actual impact of [this]
restriction on competitive market conditions to render conclusive
judgment on the bare facts." 69 Later, in Continental T V, Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc.,70 a case involving yet another vertical territorial
restriction, the Court again denied per se relief. It noted that,
although "particular applications of vertical restrictions might justify
per se prohibition,71 [a] departure from the rule-of-reason standard
must be based upon demonstrable economic effect rather than ...
upon formalistic line drawing."72 Thus, any business practice which
65. The Court itself hinted at its approach inadvertently in its reference to the
"bobtailed" application of the rule of reason which the court of appeals had used with
respect to the blanket license. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 562 F.2d at 140; see
also Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 17 n.27.
66. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
67. 372 U.S. at 253.
68. A "vertical" restraint generally entails an agreement among competitors at
different levels of the market structure (for example, "to allocate territories in order
to minimize competition"), while a "horizontal" restraint involves combinations of
competitors at the same level of the market structure. See Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. at
608.
69. White Motor Co., 372 U.S. at 261. "We do not know enough of the economic
and business stuff out of which these arrangements emerge to be certain [of anticom-
petitive restraint]." Id. at 263.
70. 433 U.S. at 36.
71. Id. at 58.
72. Id. at 58-59. The Court stated:
Per se rules thus require the Court to make broad generalizations about the
social utility of particular commercial practices. The probability that anticom-
petitive consequences will result from a practice and the severity of those con-
sequences must be balanced against its procompetitive consequences. Cases
that do not fit the generalization may arise, but a per se rule reflects the judg-
ment that such cases are not sufficiently common or important to justify the
time and expense necessary to identify them. Once established, per se rules
tend to provide guidance to the business community and to minimize the bur-
dens on litigants and the judicial system of the more complex rule-of-reason
trials, but those advantages are not sufficient in themselves to justify the crea-
tion of per se rules. If it were otherwise, all of antitrust law would be reduced
to per se rules, thus introducing an unintended and undesirable rigidity in the
law.
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did not patently restrain competition had to be examined under the
more benevolent rule of reason standard.73
In Broadcast Music, the Court went a step further and declined to
characterize the horizontal price restriction, a type of business re-
straint generally categorized as manifestly anticompetitive, as per se
unlawful. Instead, by redirecting its attention to the legislative pur-
pose of the Sherman Act,74 the Court seemed to return to Justice
Brandeis' reasoning in Board of Trade of City of Chicago:
Not all arrangements among actual or potential competitors that have an im-
pact on price are per se violations of the Sherman Act or even unreasonable
restraints. Mergers among competitors eliminate competition, including price
competition, but they are not per se illegal, and many of them withstand at-
tack under any existing antitrust standard. Joint ventures and other coopera-
tive arrangements are also not usually unlawful, at least not as price-fixing
schemes, where the agreement on price is necessary to market the product at
all.7 5
Since the Court had never previously examined the licensing meth-
ods of ASCAP or BMI and their effect on competition, the Court was
necessarily hesitant to declare these price arrangements illegal per
se.
Many lower courts interpreted the Broadcast Music case as a basic,
fundamental shift in the highest Court's approach to per se illegality
in general.7 6 These courts believed that they should no longer em-
ploy the per se rationale when faced with new or untested business
practices. Business ingenuity would be encouraged, as long as it did
not ostensibly stifle competition, and even though it involved price
fixing.7 7 A classic example of this type of reasoning, at least on the
Id. at 50 n.16 (footnote omitted). See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978), where the Court held per se unlawful an engineering asso-
ciation's canon of ethics that prohibited competitive bidding by its members only after
carefully considering a great deal of evidence, which ultimately indicated no substan-
tial procompetitive efficiencies. Id. at 692-93.
73. See also United States v. Schwinn, Arnold, & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (over-
ruled in Continental T.V, Inc., 433 U.S. at 58) (territorial limitation); Evans v. S.S.
Kresge Co., 544 F.2d 1184 (3d Cir. 1976) (joint merchandising venture), cert. denied, 438
U.S. 908 (1977).
74. The legislative purpose was to prohibit only those business combinations or re-
lationships which have a significantly detrimental effect on competition or trade.
75. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 23. Compare Board of Trade of City of Chicago,
246 U.S. at 238, supra note 13.
76. See, e.g., Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843 (6th Cir. 1979) (joint re-
fusal to deal); Mardirosian v. American Inst. of Architects, 474 F. Supp. 628 (D.D.C.
1979) (group boycott).
77. See Optivision, Inc. v. Syracuse Shopping Center Assocs., 472 F. Supp. 665
(N.D.N.Y. 1979), where an optical wholesale-retailer lessee of the Syracuse Shopping
Center Associates sued the Association and a competitor. The plaintiff charged that an
exclusivity clause, which appeared in a lease between the Association and the competi-
lower court level, was utilized in Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc. 78
In Catalano, a group of beer retailers brought an action wherein they
alleged that various beer wholesalers had engaged in a conspiracy to
restrain trade (in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act) by agree-
ing to eliminate deferred, interest-free payment terms for their re-
tailers.79 In affirming the district court's ruling that the wholesalers'
credit-fixing agreement was not per se unlawful, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals reasoned that the fixing of credit terms was not
manifestly anticompetitive, since the credit-fixing arrangement, a
"nonprice" condition of sale, might actually enhance competition. 80
As the appellate court stated:
[A]n agreement to eliminate credit could sharpen competition with respect to
price by removing a barrier perceived by some sellers to market entry. More-
over, competition could be fostered by the increased visibility of price made
possible by the agreement to eliminate credit. For example, an agreement to
eliminate credit might foster competition by increasing the visibility of the
price term, and hence, promote open price competition in an industry in
which imperfect information shielded various sellers from vigorous
competition.
8 1
In addition, "[s]imply labeling concerted conduct as price-fixing with-
out proof of purpose to affect price will not justify application of a
per se rule. The antitrust laws concern substance, not form, in the
preservation of competition."8 2 Thus, the court believed a more com-
plete examination of the impact of credit-fixing on competitive mar-
ket conditions m the beer industry was required to determine the
lawfulness of the arrangement.
On appeal, however, the Supreme Court, in a per curam opinion,
reversed.8 3 Noting that "[a] horizontal agreement to fix prices was
the archetypal example of [a plainly anticompetitive practice,] '8 4 the
Court observed that the wholesalers' agreement to eliminate credit
tor, offended sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, inter alia, as veiled attempts at
price fixing. Id. at 676. The United States District Court for the Northern District of
New York refrained from applying the per se rule. The court found no indication that
the purpose of the arrangement was to fix prices or that its effect upon prices was any-
thing more than incidental. Id. at 675. The court also believed it inappropriate to treat
the exclusivity clause as conduct unreasonable per se without further judicial analysis
of its economic impact on competition under the rule of reason. Id. at 676.
78. 605 F.2d 1097 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 446 U.S. 643 (1980), reh'g denied, 448 U.S.
911 (1980).
79. Because competing wholesalers refused to sell to retailers unless they made
payment in cash either in advance or upon delivery, the retailers sought to establish
that the wholesalers had specifically conspired to eliminate short term trade credit for-
merly granted to them on beer purchases, and therefore asked the district court to de-
clare the credit-fixing agreement illegal per se. Catalano, Inc., 605 F.2d at 1097, 1098.
80. Id. at 1099.
,81. Id.
82. Id. at 1100 (quoting L. SULLIVAN, supra note 1, § 74, at 198 (1977)). It had not
been established that the wholesalers' agreement had been entered into with the pur-
pose of restraining price competition in the industry. Id.
83. Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980).
84. Id. at 647.
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was "tantamount to an agreement to eliminate discounts... ."85 The
Court reasoned that extending interest-free credit for a period of
time was equivalent to giving a discount equal to the value of the use
of the purchase price for that period of time. Thus, the credit terms
had to be characterized as an inseparable part of the price.8 6 An
agreement to terminate this practice was, in essence, price fixing,8 7
and thus fell within the traditional per se category.88 Moreover, "the
fact that a practice may turn out not to be harmless in a particular
set of circumstances will not prevent its being declared unlawful per
se ... ", especially "when a particular concerted activity entails an ob-
vious risk of anticompetitive impact with no apparent potentially re-
deeming value."89 The Court concluded that, although "a horizontal
agreement to eliminate credit sales may remove a barrier to other
sellers who may wish to enter the market," the end result of the ar-
rangement, an agreement to eliminate credit sales, would be likely to
extinguish one form of competition among sellers.90
Catalano, if read alone, indicated that the Court was returning to
"business as usual." In other words, absent compelling circum-
stances, the Court would continue to use a per se rule only where ap-
propriate. To summarize, plainly anticompetitive agreements (i.e.,
where no elaborate study of surrounding market conditions was
needed to establish their illegality) would continue to fall within the
per se category. However, agreements where the "competitive effect
can be evaluated only by analyzing the facts peculiar to the business,
the history of the restraint, and the reasons [for its adoption would
be examined under the rule of reason]."91
But read together, Broadcast Music and Catalano make an intrigu-
ing break with past decisions. Broadcast Music, in particular, now
sets the stage for a bifurcated approach to per se horizontal price fix-
ing analysis. First, the decision suggested that, if the alleged practice
is a "naked restraint of trade,"92 which a cartel might impose, it
would clearly be per se unlawful.93 But, if the troublesome practice,
85. Id. at 648.
86. Price fixing, of course, encompasses more than the mere establishment of uni-
form prices. See Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 222.
87. Catalano, Inc., 605 F.2d at 648.
88. Id. at 649.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692.
92. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 20.
93. See id. at 19-20; see also Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. at 392.
which included an ancillary price fixing component, enhanced or pro-
duced inherently procompetitive characteristics of or justifications
for the arrangement, 94 then a "truncated" or "mini" rule of reason
analysis would be used to determine whether to apply the per se
rule.95 The abbreviated analysis might well indicate that the practice
was manifestly anticompetitive, and thus per se illegal. If not, then a
full-blown rule of reason inquiry would be employed to determine
whether or not the conduct was reasonable. 96 Although the Court
never directly acknowledged this approach,97 it had been tacitly used
in the past, and is one way to rationalize the Broadcast Music
decision.
Approximately two years after the decision in Broadcast Music, the
Court, perhaps mirroring the different possibilities of Catalano and
Broadcast Music, handed down a closely split decision in Arizona v.
Maricopa County Medical Society.98 In Maricopa, the State of Ari-
zona brought suit against the Maricopa Foundation for Medical
Care.99 The defendant was a nonprofit corporation composed of li-
94. See also R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978), where Judge Bork rea-
soned, with regard to horizontal price fixing practices (one year before Broadcast Mu-
sic was decided):
The upshot is that when the integration is essential if the activity is to be car-
ried on at all, the integration and restraints that make it efficient should be
completely lawful. But when the integration may be useful but is not essential
(in the sense that cooperation is not the essence of the activity), then the joint
venture and its ancillary restraints (including price fixing and market divi-
sion) should be lawful when three conditions are met:
(1) The agreement fixing prices ... is ancillary to a contract integration; that
is, the parties must be cooperating in an economic activity other than the
elimination of rivalry, and the agreement must be capable of increasing the
effectiveness of that cooperation and no broader than necessary for that
purpose.
(2) The collective market share of the parties does not make the restriction
of output a realistic danger ....
(3) The parties must not have demonstrated a primary purpose or intent to
restrict output.
Id. at 279. See also L. SULLIVAN, supra note 1, § 74, at 200 (1976).
95. But see Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 643 F.2d 553, 563 (9th Cir.
1980) (Larson, J., dissenting), where the dissenting judge used the phrase "truncated
rule of reason analysis" in a different sense; specifically, to indicate his perception of
the Supreme Court's approach to its rule of reason analysis in National Soc'y of Pro-
fessional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
96. On remand, the Second Circuit held that CBS had failed to prove, under the
rule of reason, that the blanket license had restrained competition. See, e.g., Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., 620 F.2d at 930.
97. The Court inherently admitted the problem which its per se analysis raised
when it stated: "The scrutiny occasionally required [under the per se rule] must not
merely subsume the burdensome analysis required under the rule of reason... or else
we should apply the rule of reason from the start." See Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 19
n.33.
98. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
99. The state initially sought injunctive relief to halt alleged price fixing conspira-
cies among two county medical societies and two "foundations for medical care" which
the medical societies had organized. Id. at 336.
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censed doctors engaged in the private practice of medicine. The state
alleged that the membership agreements between the doctors and
the foundation, which contained a promise to abide by maximum fee
schedules,100 violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.101 The district
court denied the state's motion for partial summary judgment on the
issue of liability.102 Yet, the court certified for interlocutory appeal
the question whether the membership agreements were unlawful per
se.103 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's
refusal to enter partial summary judgment.104 The Supreme Court
subsequently granted certiorari'0 5 to consider the question of
whether the undisputed facts disclosed a per se violation of section 1
of the Sherman Act.
In a 4-3 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' de-
terminations. 06 The majority opinion, penned by Justice Stevens,
seemed to adopt a very traditional, hard-line stance toward per se il-
legality. 0 7 First, the arrangement between the foundation and the
physicians was a form of price fixing. The arrangement involved a
price restraint which "tended to provide the same economic rewards
to all practitioners, regardless of [individual skill, experience, or
training]."108 Second, the fact that the Court had little experience
with the health care industry did not counsel against application of a
100. More specifically, the physicians set, by majority vote, the maximum fees that
members could claim in full payment for treatment which they provided to policy
holders under insurance plans approved by the foundation. Maricopa, 643 F.2d at 554.
101. Id. "To obtain... [foundation approval for insurance plans], the insurers ...
agree to pay the doctors' charges up to the scheduled amounts, and in exchange the
doctors agree to accept those amounts as payment in full for their services." Maricopa,
457 U.S. at 341. Arizona therefore charged that the foundation membership agree-
ments were basically contracts to fix prices. Maricopa, 643 F.2d at 555.
102. Interestingly enough, the court noted that "a recent antitrust trend appears to
be emerging where the rule of reason is the preferred method of determining whether
a particular practice is in violation of the antitrust law." App. to Pet. for Cert. 43.
103. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 336-37.
104. 643 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1980). Since the Supreme Court had not yet handed
down its decision in Catalano at the time, the court of appeals believed that, because it
knew very little about the actual competitive effects of the challenged arrangement
within the health care industry, the actual purpose and effect of the agreements
should be evaluated at trial. Moreover, the arrangement had considerable procompeti-
tive justifications. Id. at 556-57. After all, Broadcast Music had taught that, whether to
classify an arrangement as "'per se price fixing' [would] often, but not always, be a
simple matter." Id. at 558 (quoting Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 9 n.14 (emphasis ad-
ded by court)).
105. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 450 U.S. 979 (1981).
106. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 332.
107. Id. at 342-55.
108. Id. at 348.
per se rule, for per se rules were designed to avoid complicated eco-
nomic analyses.O9 The Court found that an extensive inquiry into
the health care industry would be inconsistent with Socony- Vacuum.
Justice Stevens observed:
[T]he argument that the per se rule must be rejustified for every industry that
has not been subject to significant antitrust litigation ignores the rationale for
per se rules, which in part is to avoid 'the necessity for an incredibly compli-
cated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the in-
dustry involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at
large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable-an inquiry so
often wholly fruitless when undertaken. ' 1 1 0
Third, to argue that the fee arrangement had procompetitive justifi-
cations, and therefore should escape per se condemnation, indicated a
complete misunderstanding of the per se concept."' Finally, to con-
tend that the fee schedules involved price fixing only in a literal
sense, and therefore should not be condemned outright, would be to
incorrectly interpret the Broadcast Music decision.112 As the major-
ity pointed out, the "'blanket license' was entirely different from the
product that any one composer was able to sell by himself."113 For
example, "the blanket license arrangement did not place any re-
straint on the right of an individual copyright owner to sell his own
compositions separately to any buyer at any price.""114 Here, "each of
the foundations [was] composed of individual practitioners who com-
peted with one another for patients . . . [and sold medical services].
Their combination in the form of the foundation [did] not permit
them to sell any different product."1 15 Perhaps more importantly,
the members of ASCAP and BMI delegated the power to fix the
price for the blanket license to the clearinghouse agencies. In Mari-
copa, on the other hand, the doctors themselves essentially fixed the
prices used in the fee schedules. 116 Since the Maricopa fee agree-
ments were among independent, competing entrepreneurs (i.e., doc-
tors), and set the price at which each physician-foundation member
offered his own services, they fell "squarely within the horizontal
109. Id. at 349-51.
110. Id. at 351 (quoting in part Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 5).
111. The Court rejected the foundations' contentions "that [the] fee schedules
[were] procompetitive because they make it possible to provide consumers ... with a
uniquely desirable form of health insurance coverage that could not otherwise exist."
Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 351. The majority referred to some of the Court's earlier deci-
sions which held that anticompetitive potential inherent in all price fixing agreements
justified their facial invalidation despite potentially redeeming features. Id. at 350 n.22.
112. Id. at 355-57.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 356.
116. Id. at 356 n.33. It was not necessary for the physicians themselves to set the
prices. For instance, a similar maximum fee schedule sponsored by the foundation for
another health program employed a state agency, rather than the physicians involved,
to prescribe the prices for services. Id. at 353.
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price fixing mold."117
The dissenting opinion, spearheaded by Justice Powell,118 was
equally blunt in arguing for the softer, more sensitive approach to
per se illegality.119 Although the price fixing aspect of the arrange-
ment between the foundation and the physicians was an integral part
of their association, the primary purpose of the association was to of-
fer an alternative to existing health insurance plans at procompeti-
tive prices. 120  Moreover, the foundation arrangement did not
foreclose any competition, either among physicians or insurers.121
For example, doctors "who participate[d] in the [Maricopa] plan
[were] free . .. to associate with other medical insurance plans....
and to serve directly uninsured patients-at any fee level." In like
manner, insurers who participated in the foundation plan could also
do business outside the plan with any physician at any fee level.122
As to labeling the arrangement per se unlawful on its face, the dis-
sent reminded the majority that the per se label was not to be ap-
plied to every arrangement that literally fixed prices.' 2 3 Broadcast
Music had made plain that a more discriminating approach was nec-
essary when the Court was faced with an untested business practice
which achieved procompetitive goals.124 After all, the cooperative
agreement in Maricopa, much like the blanket license in Broadcast
Music, did indeed result in a different product in that it permitted
the more economical delivery of the basic insurance service. In fact,
[t]he foundations provide a 'different product' to precisely the same extent as
did Broadcast Music's clearinghouses. The clearinghouses provided only what
copyright holders offered as individual sellers-the rights to use individual
117. Id. at 357.
118. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
119. Id.
120. "[Tjhe foundation arrangement ... 'impose[s] a meaningful limit on physi-
cians' charges,' . . . 'enables the insurance carriers to limit and to calculate more effi-
ciently the risks they underwrite,' and . .. 'serves as an effective cost containment
mechanism that has saved patients and insurers millions of dollars.' " Id. at 360.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 360.
123. Id. at 361-62.
124. Id. at 362-64. The insurance plan "in fact benefited consumers by '[allowing
insurers] to limit and to calculate more efficiently the risks they underwrite' ". Id. at
361. In addition, the dissent pointedly referred to prior statements made by the Court
in earlier decisions which indicated a more analytical approach. For instance, Sylvania
had specified that "departure from the rule-of-reason standard must be based upon de-
monstrable economic effect rather than upon formalistic line drawing." Id. at 362
(quoting Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 58-59). The dissent also cited National Socy of Profes-
sional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 679, where the Court carefully scrutinized the arrangement
under attack there before ruling it per se illegal. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 362.
compositions. The clearinghouses were able to obtain these same rights more
efficiently, however, because they eliminated the need to engage in individual
bargaining with each individual copyright owner. In the same manner, the
foundations set up an innovative means to deliver a basic service-insured
medical care from a wide range of physicians of one's choice-in a more eco-
nomical manner. The foundations' incentives in typical 'usual, customary, and
reasonable' insurance agreements with a stronger cost control mechanism: an
absolute ceiling on maximum fees that can be charged.12 5
To condemn the plan as per se illegal without a broader considera-
tion of the evidence was unwise and shortsighted.126
Although Maricopa had little precedential value in a substantive
sense, it is significant as to the Court's overall attitude toward per se
illegality in horizontal price fixing cases. While the majority re-
treated from its unanimous 1 27 stance in Broadcast Music, the dissent
continued to opt for the more sensitive adjudicative approach. The
majority insisted that the arrangement between the foundation and
physicians, which involved a uniform price restraint, invoked the per
se rule in a traditional manner.128 It made little difference that the
fee arrangement occurred in an industry with which the Court had
little experience or that the arrangement had beneficial, procompeti-
tive aspects.129 Such considerations ignored the rationale for per se
rules.130 The dissent, on the other hand, believed that the Broadcast
Music approach should control. Of particular importance was the
fact that the association between the doctors and the foundation,
even though it involved a price fixing component, was not a naked
restraint of trade. Moreover, it was a novel arrangement with which
the Court was unfamiliar.131 It also had extenuating, procompetitive
justifications. 3 2
Perhaps one reason why the Maricopa decision was so close is be-
cause the truncated rule of reason approach to per se illegality tends
to blur the distinction in general between per se and rule of reason
analyses.133 With this in mind, the majority may have wanted to re-
turn the Court to more familiar terrain. The majority's prudential
approach may also serve as a signal to lower courts to exercise cau-
tion when tempted to use a truncated rule of reason analysis.134
125. Id. at 365-66 n.12 (citation omitted).
126. Id. at 367.
127. Justice Stevens, who dissented in part in Broadcast Music, nevertheless agreed
that the blanket license was not per se unlawful. See Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 25.
128. See supra note 109.
129. See supra note 111.
130. Id.
131. See supra note 124.
132. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 367.
133. It is interesting to note, in this regard, that Justice Stevens, who dissented in
part in Broadcast Music because he believed that the blanket license should have been
declared unlawful under the rule of reason then and there, authored the majority
opinion in Maricopa.
134. At the time, lower court decisions subsequent to Broadcast Music seemed to
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Then, too, the majority may have believed the Maricopa arrangement
warranted per se condemnation, in light of the relative ease with
which the troublesome practice could have been corrected.
The Court's balance was maintained two years later in Jefferson
Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde.135 Although the opinion,
again written by Justice Stevens, concerned the legality of an alleged
tying arrangement, the decision, along with the concurring opinions
of Justices Brennan and O'Connor, appears to have significant impli-
cations regarding the Court's overall stance toward per se illegality in
horizontal price fixing situations.
In Jefferson Parish, an anesthesiologist sought, inter alia, a declar-
atory judgment that an exclusive contract between a hospital and a
firm of anesthesiologists was an unlawful tying arrangement under
section 1 of the Sherman Act.'3 6 The contract stipulated that every
patient undergoing surgery at the hospital had to use the services of
that particular group of anesthetists. The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana denied relief.137 The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. It held the agreement was
illegal per se.138 The Supreme Court granted certiorari,139 and sub-
indicate a certain amount of confusion as to how to approach per se illegality in price
fixing cases. See, e.g., National Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. National Constructors Ass'n,
678 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1982); Medical Arts Pharmacy of Stamford, Inc. v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of Conn., Inc., 675 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. National Ass'n
of Broadcasters, 536 F. Supp. 149 (D.D.C. 1982); United States v. Columbia Pictures In-
dus., 507 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). In spite of, or perhaps because of, Maricopa,
lower courts continued to use both the traditional approach as well as the truncated
rule of reason approach to per se analysis. See, e.g., Ratino v. Medical Serv. of the Dist.
of Columbia (Blue Shield), 718 F.2d 1260 (4th Cir. 1983), and Shafer v. Bulk Petroleum
Corp., 569 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Wis. 1983).
135. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
136. Id. at 5.
137. The district court found that, since the relevant geographic market was an en-
tire metropolitan area in which 20 different hospitals competed, the anticompetitive
consequences of the contract were minimal and outweighed by benefits in the form of
improved patient care. Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp., 513 F. Supp. 532, 544 (E.D. La.
1981).
138. The court of appeals believed that the contract between the hospital and the
firm constituted a tying arrangement, because the "users of the hospital's operating
rooms (the tying product) [were] also compelled to purchase the hospital's chosen an-
esthesia service (the tied product)." Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 686
F.2d 286, 289 (5th Cir. 1982). In addition, the appellate court, unlike the district court,
determined that the relevant geographic market for the tying product was sufficiently
small so that the hospital possessed "sufficient market power in the tying market to
coerce purchase of the tied product." Id. at 291.
139. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 460 U.S. 1021 (1983).
sequently reversed.140
In ruling against application of the per se rule to the arrangement,
the Court 141 pointed out that not every refusal to sell two products
separately restrained competition. 142 The seller, through "market
power,"143 must exploit "its control over the tying product to force
the buyer into the purchase of a tied product that the buyer either
did not want . . .or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on
different terms."'144 Per se condemnation, according to the Court,
would have been appropriate only if the existence of "forcing" was
probable, since application of the per se rule focused on the
probability of anticompetitive consequences. 145 The hospital had
neither the degree nor the kind of market power 146 to force patients,
about to undergo surgery, to purchase the services of a particular
anesthesiological group. And, since there was no real demand for the
purchase of anesthesiological services apart from hospital services, 147
further inquiry into actual competitive conditions was required under
the rule of reason.148
Several aspects of the Jefferson Parish opinion are noteworthy.
First, Justice Stevens again authored the Court's opinion. Yet, it was
a bare plurality.149 Next, Justice Stevens' per se analysis was at least
three times longer than his rule of reason determination.150 He ex-
plained at length as to why the alleged tying arrangement was not
per se unlawful. Since per se rules were designed to save judicial
140. The Court also held the agreement lawful under the rule of reason. See Jef-
ferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 29-32.
141. As noted, Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, albeit a plurality
comprising one Justice, since Justice Marshall joined in Justice Brennan's concur-
rence, and Chief Justice Burger, Justice Powell, and Justice Rehnquist joined in Jus-
tice O'Connor's concurring opinion.
142. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 11.
143. "Market power" may be defined crudely as the ability of a seller to force a
purchaser to buy something that he would not otherwise buy in a competitive market.
See United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enter., 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977); Northern Pac.
Ry., 356 U.S. at 6-7.
144. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12.
145. "[Als a threshold matter there must be a substantial potential for impact on
competition in order to justify per se condemnation." Id. at 16.
146. "The fact that a substantial majority of the parish's residents elect not to enter
East Jefferson [Hospital] means that the geographic data do not establish the kind of
dominant market position that obviates the need for further inquiry into actual com-
petitive conditions." Id. at 26-27.
147. "It is safe to assume that every patient undergoing a surgical operation needs
the services of an anesthesiologist; at least this record contains no evidence that the
hospital 'forced' any such services on unwilling patients." Id. at 28.
148. Id. at 17-18.
149. See supra note 141.
150. Compare Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 9-29, with Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at
29-32.
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time and energy,' 5 ' the extent of the per se discussion is interesting.
Stevens' per se analysis was almost too constrained to fit into a trun-
cated rule of reason mold. But, he did focus on what made tying ar-
rangements inherently anticompetitive, by noting the legislative
purpose of the Sherman Act. In so doing, Stevens' opinion mirrored
what the Court had done in horizontal price fixing cases up to that
time. 5 2 Perhaps Stevens ultimately was attempting to make strict
application of the per se rule in tying situations more palatable to
those members of the Court who joined in Justice O'Connor's con-
currence. 5 3 After all, use of the per se rule would not be pernicious,
in theory at least, if the per se analysis were performed correctly,
since the proper conclusion would, or should, be reached through its
use in any case. In this regard, it is significant that Justice Brennan,
with whom Justice Marshall joined, felt compelled to reaffirm his ad-
herence to the per se rule in his brief concurring opinion.154
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Jefferson Parish was even more
intriguing. O'Connor, along with Chief Justice Burger, and Justices
Powell and Rehnquist (the same three justices who had dissented in
Maricopa), believed that since correct application of the per se rule
in tying cases had always involved a truncated rule of reason analy-
sis, it made little sense to retain the per se rule in tying cases at all.
Justice O'Connor reasoned:
The 'per se' doctrine in tying cases has thus always required an elaborate in-
quiry into the economic effects of the tying arrangement. As a result, tying
doctrine incurs the costs of a rule-of-reason approach without achieving its
benefits: the doctrine calls for extensive and time-consuming economic analy-
sis characteristic of the rule of reason, but then may be interpreted to prohibit
arrangements that economic analysis would show to be beneficial. Moreover,
the per se label in the tying context has generated more confusion than coher-
ent law because it appears to invite lower courts to omit the analysis of eco-
nomic circumstances of the tie that has always been a necessary element of
tying analysis. The time has therefore come to abandon the 'per se' label and
151. Per se rules always contain a degree of arbitrariness. They are justified on
the assumption that the gains from imposition of the rule will far outweigh
the losses and that significant administrative advantages will result. In other
words, the potential competitive harm plus the administrative costs of deter-
mining in what particular situations the practice may be harmful must far
outweigh the benefits that may result. If the potential benefits in the aggre-
gate are outweighed to this degree, then they are simply not worth identifying
in individual cases.
United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
152. See also National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984), discussed infra text accompanying notes 183-87.
153. See infra text accompanying note 155.
154. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 32.
refocus the inquiry on the adverse economic effects, and the potential eco-
nomic benefits, that the tie may have. 1 55
Thus, Jefferson Parish, when viewed as a whole, continued to show
virtually the same split in the Court, this time with respect to tying
arrangements, regarding strict application of the per se rule. Indeed,
Jefferson Parish may well go further, and have more significance for
alleged tying practices than Broadcast Music had for horizontal price
fixing arrangements, for Jefferson Parish now appears to make it far
easier for defendants to prevail against per se allegations in future ty-
ing cases, much as Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.156 does
in vertical price fixing cases.
In Monsanto, Spray-Rite, a wholesale distributor of agricultural
chemicals, brought suit under section 1 of the Sherman Act against
manufacturer Monsanto. Spray-Rite alleged that Monsanto had con-
spired with certain other distributors to fix the resale prices which
Monsanto set for its products sold to Spray-Rite. Plaintiff also
claimed Monsanto had terminated Spray-Rite's authorized distribu-
torship, in furtherance of the conspiracy. 157 Both the district court
and the court of appeals found Monsanto's conduct per se unlaw-
ful.158 On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, but
held that the court of appeals applied the wrong standard of proof.159
The Monsanto decision primarily concerned the correct standard of
proof in a vertical price fixing case. But, certain statements made by
the Court are significant with respect to the truncated rule of reason
approach in horizontal price fixing situations. While distinguishing
concerted action to set prices from concerted action on nonprice re-
strictions in distributor-termination cases, the Court noted that the
legality of alleged anticompetitive conduct should be judged primar-
ily by its "market impact."160 The economic effect of legal and illegal
behavior, however, is often indistinguishable, as is lawful and unlaw-
ful conduct by the parties.161 It was, therefore, crucial that the ker-
nel of the alleged unlawful practice be pinpointed and then carefully
analyzed in order to determine accurately whether the practice was
in fact per se unlawful.162 By virtually setting forth the evidentiary
criteria which one can now use to escape per se condemnation of ver-
tical price fixing, Monsanto appears to weaken significantly the
probability that the per se rule will operate in subsequent vertical
155. Id. at 34-35 (footnote omitted).
156. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
157. Id. at 757.
158. See Spray-Rite Service Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1982).
159. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
160. Id. at 762.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 763.
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price fixing cases. Thus, the virtually unanimous decision163 further
erodes, to some degree, the possibility of strict application of the per
se rule, at least in vertical price fixing cases.
During the same term in which it decided Jefferson Parish and
Monsanto, the Supreme Court also handed down National Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Oklahoma.164 In
NCAA, two universities in the College Football Association (CFA)165
brought suit against the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA).166 The plaintiffs alleged that the television plan, which the
NCAA had adopted for the 1982-1985 football seasons,167 violated the
Sherman Act. 168 Under the NCAA plan, the American Broadcasting
Company (ABC) and the Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS)
"shared exclusive first rights to negotiate with NCAA member[s] [as
to] the live broadcast of football games."'169 ABC and CBS then guar-
anteed to pay a "minimum aggregate compensation" to the participat-
ing NCAA member institutions over the contract period.170 The
master agreement itself did not define "the method of computing the
compensation for each game.' 17' Instead, an NCAA representative
163. Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment.
164. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
165. The CFA was an organization of major football-playing colleges within the Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Association. It attempted to achieve "a greater voice in the
formulation of football television policy than [the group had] in the NCAA" by devel-
oping its own television plan. Id. It also obtained a separate contract offer from the
National Broadcasting Company (NBC). This contract provided for a greater number
of television appearances for each institution and for increased overall revenues col-
lected by CFA members. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F.
Supp. 1276, 1285 (W.D. Okla. 1982). See infra note 159.
166. The NCAA plays a vital role in the regulation of amateur collegiate sports by
"integrat[ing] the rulemaking and rule-enforcing activities of its member institutions."
Among other things, it determines standards of amateurism, such as playing rules, eli-
gibility requirements, recruiting standards, and game schedulings. It also formulates a
television plan which regulates the televised appearances of its member institutions'
football games by national television networks. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla.
v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147, 1153 (10th Cir. 1983).
167. The major purpose of the NCAA's football television plan was "to reduce the
adverse effect of live television upon football game attendance [by] limit[ing] the total
amount of televised intercollegiate football and the number of games that any one
[team could] televise." NCAA, 468 U.S. at 85.
168. Specifically, the CFA universities brought suit because "the NCAA
[threatened] disciplinary action against any CFA member that complied with the CFA-
NBC contract." Id. at 85. This was a serious deterrent, since "[o]ne sanction often lev-
ied [by the NCAA] for violation of [its] rules [was] the restriction of television appear-
ances." NCAA, 707 F.2d at 1153.
169. NCAA, 707 F.2d at 1150.
170. Id.
171. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 93.
would compute the costs "for different types of telecasts .... [T]he
aggregate of all the payments would presumably total the minimum
aggregate compensation set forth in the basic agreement."1 72
However, there were some problems with this arrangement: "the
amount that any team receive[d] [changed neither] with the size of
the viewing audience, the number of markets in which the game
[was] telecast, [n]or [with] the particular characteristics of the game
or the participating teams."173 Rather, the NCAA plan provided
"that the carrying networks make alternate selections of those games
they wished to televise . . .thereby obtain[ing] exclusive right[s] to
submit a bid at an essentially fixed price to the institutions in-
volved."'74 The United States District Court for the Western District
of Oklahoma initially granted injunctive relief. 75 After a full trial,
the district court found that the controls exercised by the NCAA
over the televising of college football games violated the antitrust
laws.176 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed and held the
NCAA television plan constituted per se illegal price fixing.177
The appellate court decided "the restraints contained in the televi-
sion plan [did] not increase the efficiency of the NCAA's rulemaking
integration and [were] broader than necessary to achieve its asserted
procompetitive goals." 7 8 Moreover,
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. Thus, much like a cartel, the NCAA in effect "established a uniform price
for the products of each of [its] member producers, with no regard for the differing
quality of the products or the consumer demand for [them]." NCAA, 546 F. Supp. at
1300-01. In other words, "the price ... paid for the right to televise any particular
game [was] responsive neither to the relative quality of the teams playing the game
nor to viewer preference." NCAA, 468 U.S. at 106 n.30 (quoting NCAA, 546 F. Supp. at
1318).
175. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276 (W.D.
Okla. 1982). Although a preliminary injunction prevented the NCAA from initiating
disciplinary proceedings against any CFA member, most CFA participants were no
longer willing to commit themselves to the NBC contract, and therefore the agree-
ment was never consummated. Id. at 1286.
176. The district court believed that the television plan virtually eliminated compe-
tition for broadcasting rights:
First, the networks have no intention to engage in bidding. Second, once the
network holding first choice for any given date has made its choice and agreed
to a rights fee for that game with the two teams involved, the other network
is in a monopsony position. The schools cannot threaten to sell the broadcast
rights to any other network. They cannot sell to NBC without committing a
violation of NCAA rules. They cannot sell to the network which had first
choice over that particular date because, again, they would be in violation of
NCAA rules, and the network would be in violation of its agreement with
NCAA. Thus, NCAA creates a single eligible buyer for the product of all but
the two schools selected by the network having first choice. Free market
competition is thus destroyed under the ... plan.
Id. at 1292-93.
177. NCAA, 707 F.2d at 1152, 1156.
178. Id. at 1154.
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[a]s did the performing rights societies in Broadcast Music, the NCAA offers a
product--exclusive broadcast rights to all NCAA games-that is different
from that which the individual schools could offer. However, unlike the blan-
ket license at issue in Broadcast Music, the new and different product in this
case comes at the expense of the product that would otherwise be offered by
the schools. In Broadcast Music, the copyright holders retained the right to
negotiate individual contracts: they could sell outside the blanket licensing ar-
rangement. Under the television plan at issue here schools are not permitted
to sell outside the network contracts. Not only does this restraint inhibit the
freedom of the individual schools, it also poses a greater risk of cartelization
than was present in Broadcast Music. There, the right of the copyright hold-
ers to sell outside the blanket licensing arrangement ensured the presence of
potential competition to inhibit the exercise of market power by the perform-
ing rights societies. Here, every producer of commercially salable intercollegi-
ate football is bound to sell through the television plan only. There is no
potential competition from producers of intercollegiate football.
1 7 9
The Supreme Court later affirmed the judgment,1o but not upon
the rationale of the court of appeals.181 The NCAA's plan prevented
member institutions from competing against one another. There was
no contest over price or television rights. Thus, any "real price nego-
tiation between broadcasters and institutions ... constitut[ed] a hori-
zontal [restraint of trade and] price fixing.' 82 Despite these facts,
the Supreme Court decided against application of the per se rule to
the arrangement. The Court explained that its decision to withhold
application of the rule was not based upon
a lack of judicial experience with this type of arrangement, on the fact that
the NCAA was organized as a nonprofit entity, or on any respect for the
NCAA's historic role in preservation and encouragment of intercollegiate am-
ateur athletics. Rather ... [the] critical [point was] that, [due to the inherent
nature of this particular industry] horizontal restraints on competition [were]
essential if the product [was] to be available at all.1 8 3
After all, the NCAA played an important role in allowing college
football to preserve its character, and as a result, enabled a product
to be marketed which might otherwise have been unavailable.' 8 4 In
179. Id. at 1156.
180. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
181. The appellate court found that the plan was unlawful not only per se but also
under the rule of reason, in that "its anticompetitive limitation on price and output
was not offset by any procompetitive justification sufficient to save the plan even when
the totality of the circumstances was examined." NCAA, 707 F.2d at 1157-60. Yet, the
Supreme Court held the plan illegal under the rule of reason only. See infra text ac-
companying notes 187-89.
182. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 99-100.
183. Id. at 100-01. See also supra note 94.
184. Specifically, the NCAA marketed "contests between competing institutions.
[The competitions would have been totally] ineffective if there were no rules on which
the competitors agreed .... Thus, in order to preserve the character and quality of
the product, many rules and restrictions had to be mutually agreed upon by the mem-
ber institutions, such as the size of the field, the number of players on a team, class
fact, in performing the function of regulating and defining competi-
tion, the NCAA actually widened consumer choices, and thus pro-
duced procompetitive results. Thus, despite the fact that the
television plan involved horizontal restraints on the ability of mem-
ber institutions to compete in terms of price and output, Broadcast
Music counseled that a fair evaluation of the competitive character of
and the justifications for the restraints was required under the rule
of reason. 185
As in Broadcast Music, a unanimous Court1s 6 once again agreed
that an alleged anticompetitive practice, which unquestionably in-
volved the fixing of prices among competitors, was not per se invalid.
The NCAA marketed a television plan which, much like the blanket
license arrangement in Broadcast Music, had an essentially ancillary
price fixing component. It achieved procompetitive efficiencies. The
practice did not "facially appear to be one that would always or al-
most always tend to restrict competition and decrease output."187
By deciding not to apply the per se rule, the Court engaged in
fairly extensive analysis of the alleged restraint and its effect on com-
petition. The Court used, as in Broadcast Music, a truncated rule of
reason approach to determine the applicability of the per se rule.
The Court tacitly acknowledged its approach when it stated:
Indeed, there is often no bright line separating per se from Rule of Reason
analysis. Per se rules may require considerable inquiry into market conditions
before the evidence justifies a presumption of anticompetitive conduct. For
example, while the Court has spoken of a 'per se' rule against tying arrange-
ments, it has also recognized that tying may have procompetitive justifications
that make it inappropriate to condemn without considerable market
analysis.1 8
8
NCAA is the most recent Supreme Court horizontal price fixing
case to use the truncated rule of reason approach to determine per se
illegality. In a sense, the NCAA opinion balances out Broadcast Mu-
sic. After all, both cases held the per se rule inapplicable to alleged
horizontal restraints. Yet, the blanket license in Broadcast Music was
attendance requirements, and the like. If an institution were to have adopted such re-
strictions unilaterally, its effectiveness as a competitor might easily have been compro-
mised. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101.
185. Id. at 103.
186. Although Justice White, with whom Justice Rehnquist joined, dissented in
NCAA on the ground that the television arrangement should have passed muster
under the rule of reason, both dissenting Justices appeared to agree that the NCAA's
television plan was not per se unlawful. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 120-36.
187. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 19-20.
188. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104 n.26 (citation omitted). Even the court of appeals ad-
mitted that "it is difficult to assess the validity of the NCAA's argument without get-
ting into the enormous complexities of market definition that the per se rule seeks to
avoid." NCAA, 707 F.2d at 1155 (quoting R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX at 269).
In this regard, it is interesting to note that the Supreme Court placed much of the ap-
pellate court's per se reasoning in its rule of reason analysis instead. See NCAA, 468
U.S. at 103-20.
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subsequently held lawful on remand under the rule of reason, while
the television plan in NCAA was found unlawful by the Court itself
under the rule of reason. From the standpoint of procompetitive jus-
tification, the controlling factor as to whether the Court will use the
truncated rule of reason approach, the split ruling in NCAA is troub-
lesome. Although the Court, in effect, ruled the television plan per
se lawful, the plan nowhere appeared to lower prices or increase out-
put in the football "industry." In other words, the NCAA arrange-
ment was unlike the Broadcast Music licensing practice in that the
NCAA plan did not appear to create procompetitive market efficien-
cies, as did the blanket license practice in Broadcast Music. The up-
shot is that perhaps the television plan in NCAA should not have
escaped per se condemnation under the truncated rule of reason ap-
proach. Even the Court itself may have recognized this inadvertently
by holding the television plan unlawful under a full-blown rule of
reason determination.
As to the question of why the balance of the Court shifted so dra-
matically in NCAA from that in Maricopa, perhaps the Court be-
lieved that NCAA presented a clearer case in which to apply safely a
truncated rule of reason approach without giving lower courts too
much leeway in using it as well. Perhaps, too, more members of the
Court were willing to adopt the truncated approach in light of the
fact that NCAA was decided during the same term as Monsanto and
Jefferson Parish.
Thus, for over half a century, the Supreme Court has used the per
se rule in antitrust litigation in order to avoid prolonged and tedious
investigations into market practices which, based on the Court's past
experience, would virtually always be determined unlawful. In this
way, horizontal price fixing has traditionally been subject to the per
se rule, and therefore conclusively presumed illegal under the Sher-
man Act without regard to the particular problems or characteristics
of the industry in which it existed, and no showing of its purpose,
aim, or effect on the market could be raised in its defense.
With its decision in Broadcast Music, however, the Court seemed to
soften its per se approach. It focused more particularly on the true
effect which the alleged restraint had on the operation of the indus-
try in question, something to which the Court previously had gener-
ally paid mere lip service when applying the per se rule. Hence,
Broadcast Music established that when an alleged restraint, which in-
cluded horizontal price fixing as only one of its many components, ac-
tually enhanced inherently procompetitive characteristics of and
justifications for its use, then the troublesome practice would survive
a per se inquiry.
The opinions in subsequent cases, such as Catalano, Maricopa, and
NCAA, along with Jefferson Parish and Monsanto, all tend to support
this view. Indeed, the Court seems to be correcting its course a few
degrees when applying the per se rule in order to bring operation of
the rule back into line with the original legislative purpose of the
Sherman Act, which is to prohibit only those business restraints
which are in fact unreasonable. In a sense, the Court is examining
market practices as it always has under the per se rule, but is doing
so in a manner which is perhaps more transparent than it once was.
Whether this trend will continue, and perhaps solidify, depends on
future decisions by the Court regarding untested business arrange-
ments which will push the law to its limits.18 9
189. Subsequent to the NCAA decision, lower courts have continued to apply, some-
what haphazardly, both the traditional and Broadcast Music per se approaches to hori-
zontal price fixing practices. See, e.g., Northwest Publications, Inc. v. Crumb, 752 F.2d
473 (9th Cir. 1984); Vogel v. American Soc'y of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1984);
Franson D.K.S. Tom v. Hawaii Dental Serv., 606 F. Supp. 584 (D. Hawaii 1985); United
States v. Stop & Shop Cos., No. B 84-51 (D. Conn. Nov. 8, 1984).
